The Legislative and Regulatory History of Follow-On Biologics by Drabant, Anna
Health Law and Policy Brief
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 4
10-21-2013
The Legislative and Regulatory History of Follow-
On Biologics
Anna Drabant
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hlp
Part of the Health Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Health Law and Policy Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law.
For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Drabant, Anna. "The Legislative and Regulatory History of Follow-On Biologics." Health Law & Policy Brief 5, no. 1 (2011): 28-35.
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) into
laxw. Part of the PPACA, referred to as the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCI).
amended the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The
BPCI created an abbreviated approval pathway for
biologics that are biosimilar or "interchangeable" with
an innovator biologic. These similar biologics are
often referred to as "followx -on biologics" (F0Bs). The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has created a
focus group to determine an implementation approach
to the BPCI that will be "consistent, efficient and
scientifically sound . . . ." Since 2004, the FDA has
advocated that Congress pass legislation allowing an
abbreviated approval process for folloxx-on biologics,
mirroring the abbreviated process in the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) for drugs.4 After years of
debate and several proposed bills, the 111th Congress
finally succeeded in passing legislation containing an
abbreviated process for F013s. Ihe FDA must now
determine how to draft regulations that will adequately
assure safety and efficacy.
Although the precise consumer savings created by
allowing FOBs on the market is not known, a 2007
Congressional Budget Office report estimated that
the abbreviated pathway in the FDCA for generic
drugs reduced drug spending in 1994 by eight to ten
billion dollars.' T1his savings for consumers is due in
part to significant savings for generic manufacturers
in research and development, including fewer clinical
trial requirements. One can speculate that a similar
savings may result from an abbreviated pathway for
FOBs.
T his article will address the scientific and regulatory
issues concerning FO13s, followed by a discussion
on the relevant legislative and regulatory history.
T'hen, the article will address the industry, consumer,
and agency perspectives on key topics. Finally, this
article will suggest legislative and regulatory policy
recommendations.
A. Scientific and Regulatory Background of
Biologies and Generics
Congress has expressly distinguished the inherent
differences between traditional drug products and
biologics through statutory language. Congress
defined a 'drug product' as a product that is "intended
for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment
or prevention of disease," and "intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals."I Congress defined a 'biologic product' as a
"virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine,
blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic
product, protein . . . applicable to the prevention.,
treatment., or cure of a disease or condition of human
beings." The pharmaceutical industry generally
accepts drugs as small molecule products ranging
from twenty to one hundred atoms, or in the case of
hormones, two hundred to three thousand atoms.10
In contrast, biologics typically have five thousand to
fifty thousand atoms. iThe processes by which small
molecule drugs and large molecule biologics are
manufactured differ greatly as well. Small molecule
drugs are synthesized using chemical reactions; the
proteins used in biologics have unique and complex
structures that must be genetically altered through
the manufacturing process. Minor changes in the
manufacturing process of biologics can result in
significant and potentially dangerous changes between
the innoxvator product and the FOB.1
The FDCA created two pathways to approve generic
drugs: sections 505() and 505(b)(2). U'nder both
pathway s, the generic drug sponsor can rely on the
FDA's previous finding that the innovator drug was safe
and effective. The generic drug sponsor is required to
show either that the generic drug is chemically the same,
thus bioequivalent, or sufficiently similar, as supported
by non-clinical studis1 Under this authority, the
FDA has approxved abbrexviatcd FOB applications
wh len the related to iinnoxvator biologic wxas originally
approv ed under the FD)CA, not the P1HSA.i" These
[013 approxvals can only be done through the 505(b)
(2) application piocess. because the 505(j) application
requires a sboxwing of biocquixalence, something that
cannot be demonstrated with current scientific technology for biologics due
to their large and complex nature.1 U1nder the 505(j) abbreviated approval
process, the generic drug is deemed to be chemically and structurally
identical to the innovator drug: this cannot be demonstrated for biologics.I
Thus, F013s are biosimilar, but not chemically and structurally identical to
the innovator biologic product.
B. Legislative Background
Over the past five years Congress has made over half a dozen attempts to
pass legislation creating an abbreviated pathway for I013s. Ater several
unsuccesslul attempts, the 111Ith Congress passed 11.R. 3590, commonly
knovn as PPvCA, which included an abbreviated pathway for FOIls
through the 3PCI. To understand how Congress arrived at the provisions
included in the BPCIL it is important to look at the various provisions that
Congress debated over the past several years in previous bills.
1. Unsuccessfid Legislative Attenpts to Create an Abbreviated Pathwiiay
a. 109th Congress
H.R. 6257 and S. 4016, theAccess to Life-Saving Medicines Act (introduced
September 29, 2006 by Congressman Wiaxman and Senator Schumer),
created an abbreviated pathway for F013 sponsors based on similarity to
an innovator biologic and required only that the FO11 sponsor submit data
supporting that the F013 was comparable to the innovator biologic." This
proposed legislation also gave the Secretary of the Department of lealth
and luman Services (IllIS) the discretion to determine interchangeability
between a FOB11 and an innovator biologic.iQ
b. 110th Congress
The 110th Congress considered several bills with vastly different provisions.
Support for these various bills also differed greatly depending on the
provisions. For example, H.R. 1038, the Access to Life-Saving Medicine
Act (introduced on February 14, 2007 by Congressman WN axman), and S.
623 (a companion bill introduced February 15, 2007 by Senator Schumer)
would have amended the PISA to allow for an abbreviated application
process for FO3s where the sponsor could showv that the FO 11was
"comparable to or interchangeable with" the innovator drug.") Ihe bills
specifically granted the IDA the authority to approve '013s with the "same
or similar active ingredient" as the innovator biologic and alloved the
FDA to make a determination that the F013 and the innovator biologic are
interchangeable.2 These bills were very similar to the bills Congressman
Waxman and Senator Schumer introduced during the 109th Congress in
that both sets of bills emphasized interchangeability. Unlike the majority
of bills brought before Congress in recent y ears, these bills created only
36 months of exelusiv ity." Not surprisingl, this provision xvas vvidely
supported by the geiieric pharnmaceutical industry.
H.R. 1956, the Patient Protection and Innov ativ e Biologic M edicines Act
of 2007 (introduced on April 19, 2007 by Congressman Inslee), created
an abbrev iated pathvway for "similar" biologic products. provided tvwo
conditions wvere met: 1) they conformed to specific FDA guidance that
vvas to be established following the enactment of the bill: and 2) the FDA
determined the biologic was safe, pure, and potent based on non-clinical
studies.23 HfR. 1956, unlike IR. 1038 and S. 623, would not have allowed
the FDA to make a determination that a FOB was therapeutically equivalent
to the innovator biologic and thus interchangeable.24 Under this bill, a FOB
sponsor would not be able to submit an application to the FDA until twelve
years alter the date of approval of the innovator biologic.) Additionally,
the FDA would not be able to approve the F013 application until fourteen
years after the same date, or fifteen years if the F DA approved certain
supplements to the innovator's application.2 A FOB could be approved
only for the same indications as the innovator biologic.
S. 1505, the Affordable Biologics for Consumers Act of 2007 (introduced
May 24, 2007 by former Senator Gregg), was very similar to It.R. 1956 in
its FOB application approval requirements, indication requirements, and
prohibition on a determination by the FDlAthat the F013 was interchangeable
with or therapeutically equivalent to the innovator biologic.28 However,
it prohibited the FDA approval of a FOB application until sixteen years
after the date of approval of the innovator biologic if the FDA approved a
supplement to the innovator's application within the first twelve years after
the original date of approval.i
S. 1695, the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007
(introduced June 26, 2007 by the late Senator Kennedy), created an
abbreviated process for FOBs that are biosimilar to or interchangeable with
the innovator biologic.'0 This bill defined an interchangeable FOB as one
that: (1) is biosimilar to the innovator biologic; (2) will produce the same
clinical result, and (3) can be switched or alternated .with the innovator drug
without any increased safety or efficacy concerns.)i S. 1695 also required
the FDA to issue guidance on what specific criteria the agency xvould use to
determine biosimilarity or interchangeability. 2 Perhaps striking a balance
between H.R. 1038 and S. 623's thirty-six month exclusivity period and the
proposed fifteen or sixteen years in H.R. 1956 and S. 1505, respectively, S.
1695 would have allowed the FDA to approve F013s alter twelve years of
exclusivity T31he bill, however, allowed for an extended exclusivity period
for biologics for rare diseases, a provision with great merit, but not often
contemplated in previous bills.34 To some degree, S. 1695 left reliance on
the innovator's science and experience up to the discretion of Secretary.'
S. 1695 would have required the Secretary to study the agency's efficiency
in evaluating FOB applications and make a recommendation to Congress
about whether the user fees for FOBs needed to be adjusted. 3 6 Additionally,
S. 1695 would not allow subsequent FOBs to rely on the marketing or
presence of the first FOB to show safety of efficacy.
H.R. 5629, the Pathway for Biosimilars Act ( introduced .March 13, 2008 by
Congresswoman Eschoo), also created an abbreviated pathway for FOBs
that are biosimilar to or interchangeable with an innovator biologic.38 H.R.
5629 left a great deal of discretion to the Secretary, requiring only that
she make a determination on vvhat the agency wvould consider biosimilar
or interchangeable. 39 Ulike its many predecessors, H.Rf. 5629 explicitly
prohibited a FOB3 licensure if the product contained certain agents or
toxins.40 lput like S. 1695, H.R. 5629 wxould have allovved the FDA)' to
approve 1FOB applications twelve years aftei the date the innovator biologic
wvas approv ed.41
c. 111th Congress
H.R. 1427 and 5. 726, the Promoting Innovation and Access to Life-
Saving Medicine Act (introduced March 11, 2009 and March 26, 2009
by Congressman Waxman and Senator Schumer, respectively), provided
an abbreviated pathway for FOB applications where the sponsor
demonstrated that the F 013was highly biosimilar
or interchangeable.42 This legislation also required
the applicant to demonstrate the safety, purity and
potency of the 1 013 H.11R. 1427 and S. 726 would
have allowed the Secretary to make a determination
of interchangeability if the same clinical results were
expected from the FOB as the innovator biologic.
I.R. 1548, the Pathway for liosimilars Act(introduced
March 17, 2009 by Congresswoman Eschoo), set forth
similar biosimilar and interchangeability requirements
as previous legislation. IR. 1548, like 11.R. 5629,
prohibited an F013 approval if the FOB contained
certain agents or toxins or a schedule I or II controlled
substance, unless there was a determination from
the Secretary that the FOB approval would not lead
to any increased public health risk.4 H.R. 1548 also
prohibited the HHS Secretary from approving a
FOB until twelve years after the date of approval of
the innovator biologic and prohibited the FDA from
evaluating a FOB application against more than one
innovator product.4
2. The BPC in .R. 3590 as Enacted by the 111th
Congress
One goal of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Amendments to
the FDCA was to create an abbreviated pathway for
generic drugs to enter the market. Ihe BPC I was based
on a very similar goal. Americans spend an estimated
40.3 billion dollars a year on biologic products.47
Although the specific reduction in prices once F013s
come onto the market is not known, the price of many
small molecule drugs can be reduced by up to 80%
after a generic enters the market.48
Ihe BIPCI creates an abbreviated process for FOl3s
that are proven biosimilar through analytical, animal;
and clinical studies that demonstrate safety, purity and
potency.I49lowever, the I3PCI gives the Secretary the
authority to determine that any of the above mentioned
studies, including clinical studies, are "unnecessary."'
The Secretary may rely on any publicly available
intormation wshen making safety purity, and potency
determinations regarding the FOB.5  Thus, it can
be inferred that the FDA cannot use the innoxvator's
piroprietary informiation. [The 1BPCI also requires th~e
Secretary to classify a 1013 as interchangeable ssith
the innoxator biologic if biosimilarity is established
and the 1FOB sponsoi subniits data to suppoit diat the
same clinical icsult can be expected from the 1013
as the innosator biologic.> Like H. R. 1548, a 1FOB
submitted under this abbrev iated process cannot be
evaluated against more than one innovator biologic.5
The FDA may not approve a FOB application until
twelve years after the date the innovator biologic
was approved, and a F013 sponsor may not submit an
application to the FDA until four years after the same
date.5 Unlike many previous bills, the BPCI does not
give an extension ifthe FDA approves a supplemental
application to the innovator biologic.>
C. Recent RegulatoryActions
In 2004, the Acting Commissioner of the FDA, Lester
Crawford, testified before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. 6 Crassford stated that it was a priority of the
FDA to make innovative treatments more affordable.
lie also stated that, hile similarity between large
biologics would be difficult to shos, it was scientifically
possible to show similarity for small molecule
biologics.> Through Crawford's testimony, the FDA
stressed the public policy need to move forward with
FOB legislation to alloss for greater affordable access
to important life-saving treatments, emphasizing a
concern for seniors and others who struggle to pay for
expensive biologic products. The FDA also stressed
the scientific limitations and proposed to hold public
meetings to examine the scientific considerations
involved in an abbreviated FB013 pathway.60 Crawford
conceded hat the agency did not believe it had the
authority under the then-current legislation to move
forward with an abbreviated FOB application that
relies on an innovator biologic approved under the
PHSA.61
Following Crawford's testimony and the promise
to examine turther the scientific issues involved
with approving FO13s, the FDA held three public
workshops in 2004 and 2005.62 In response to these
meetings, the FDA received several dozen comments
from pharmaceutical associations and companies,
consumers, and health care professionals.63 More
recently, in response to the 2007 and 2008 proposed
legislation, the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers ofAmerica (PhRMA), which represents
pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies,
issued a statement commending S. I695 as providing
an environment that would sustain innovation.64
PhRMAX reiterated that the "[d~evelopement of
biologics is scientifhcalls complex, tinie consuming,
and requiires significant insvestment."'
Additionally, Janet WXood ock, D)eputy Commissioner
of FD1A. testified before dhe H ouse Committee on
IEnergy andi Coninirce, Subcommittee on Health, in
May ot 2007.66 In her testimony, Woodcock expressed
the concern that esven if a 1FOB is found to be sate and
effectiv e, it may not be interchangeable xsith the original
innovator biologic." Following \Xoodcock's testimony,
the FDA responded to a series of questions from the
Subcommittee on Health in September of 2008.6 The
FDA reiterated numerous times the current scientific
limitations in determining the clinical equivalence
of an innovator biologic and a FOB.69 As a result of
the current scientific limitations in comparing an
innovator biologic and a FOB, the FDA recommended
that interchangeability be allowved only after the F013
had conducted a series of clinical studies establishing
the safety and efficacy of switching between the two
biologics."
In November of 2010, the FDA held a two-day public
meeting.n Although the F1A has not yet produced
a report or made any statements about what was
learned at this meeting, a few entities have submitted
comments in response. The FDA has generally
praised the BPCI as being in line with the FDAX's policy
goal of "permitting appropriate reliance on what is
already known about a drug. thereby saving time and
resources and avoiding unnecessary duplication of
human or animal testing."73
HL Pr spectives onthe Ise
A. Studies Required for the FOB and Reliance
on Innovators' Studies
Some industry representatives assert that each FOB
must be shonii to be safe and effective through
adequate and well-controlled clinical studies of that
particular product. 4 Ihey argue that due to the complex
structure of biologics, the manufacturing process can
alter the safety and elficacy of the product.7 Iurther,
some industry representatives argue that the F013
sponsor should not be able to rely on any studies or
research from the innovator product.76 The FDA
has also expressed concern that any manufacturing
changes. which would undoubtedly exist between
an innovator biologic and a FOB, could significantly
alter the safety, identity, purity, and potency of the
product. 'Thus, the FDA maintains that Congress
should hold F013 applicants to the same high standards
as innoxator biologics, including requiring at least
some clinical studies to shoxw safety and efficacy.
T he FDA contends. however, thnt clinical indication-
specific studies may not be needed. nnd thus any bill
should include some regulatory discretion."~
Some haxe also argued that if [013 applications
require extensixve studies, it wxill take much longer and
be much more expensixve to dev elop F-Ols, xxhich in
turn may discournge some potentinl 1FOB sponsors."
T his xill result in fexwer price competitions tor specific
biologics and wxill result in less saxvings in the health
care sy stcm from thc nbbrexviated FOB process.
Immunogenicity is how a particular biologic stimulates
one's immune systeni. The FDA has recently stated
that current science will not allow it to determine the
immunogenicity of complex proteins based on the
innovator biologic's inmunogenicity, and thus, clinical
studies will be needed to establish the immunogenicity
of the FOB.82 In 2008, the IDA specifically told
Congress that any legislation creating an abbreviated
FOB process must mandate such clinical studies, but
perhaps give the FDA the discretion to determine the
extent of clinical studies required.
While many assert that the current science cannot
support safety, purity, potency findings without
product-specific clinical studies., other associations
assert the science and technology to establish that two
complex biologic products are equivalent not only
does exist, but has for years.84
IDA practice to date, with regard to biologics
approved through the 505(b)(2) abbreviated pathway
when the innovator application was made as drug
under the FDCA rather than a biologic under the
BLA, has always been to require clinical studies."
Further, to date, the FDA has not been willing to make
determinations of interchangeabilitt8 6
B. Interchangeability
Unlike small molecule drugs, where chemical testing
can show that the generic is chemically equivalent
to the innovator and thus therapeutically equivalent
to the innovator drug, biologies cannot be deemed
chemically the same due to their complexity and the
manufacturing process, nor would such be sufficient to
warrant a finding of therapeutic equivalence.
Even as recenth as 2008, the FDA has asserted that
the technology to determine if a FOB is the same as an
innovator biologic does not exist, or at least not with
sufficient reliabilitx : The FDA contends that even if a
FOB can shoxx biosimilarity, there are still significant
scientific challenges to showing interchangeability and,
as such, the FII4 has serious safety concerns about
any determinations of interchangeability." Switching
betaween biologic products has also been shown having
seiious negatixe imipacts on efficacx, ns wxell as raising
patient snfety concerns.89 These snfety concerns are
paramount to any benefits that patients might (derixve
from sxxitching from an innoxvator biologic to a FOB.
The FDA has long adxvocnted thnt a patient should
only be sxxitched fromi an innoxvator biologic to n FOB
upon thc express adxvice of the patient's phy sician as an
altcrnatixve treatmient, and that alloxxiing pharmacists to
sxxitch the txxo biologic products could rcsult in scrious
safety concerns or exveii death.90
Some industry representatives further assert that a
FOB sponsor must conduct 'adequate comparative
clinical trials to establish that its product acts the same as, rather than
similar to, the innovator product" before the pharmacist should be allowed
to substitute the F013 for the innovator product.91 Others also assert that a
pharmacist should only be allowed to substitute the innovator product with
the FO13 ifrthe treating physician agrees to it.92 Currently, the I14)k defines
therapeutic equivalence as products that are sate and effective. "contain
identical amounts of the same active drug ingredient in the same dosage
form and route of administration, and
. . . meet ... applicable standards of
strength, quality, purity, and identity,"
and are bioequivalent.93
To establish interchangeability, the
FDA has asserted that the FOB would
need to show that repeated switches
between the FOB and the innovator
biologic would not negatively affect
safety and efficacy.94 Given the
current state of science, it is highly " ""'<
unlikely that an F013 sponsor could
establish this without extensive
clinical studies.>9 Absent of which,
the FDA believes a switch between \\EN,
biologics should only happen when a
physician has determined that another
biologic would be the appropriate treatment option.> The FDA asserts
that any bill passed by Congress should require clinical studies before the
Secretary can consider making a determination of interchangeability."
C. Traceability
To allow for quick and efficient recalls in case of an adverse event, some
industry representatives call for I'013s to be clearly identifiable and
traceable.>1 This seems unnecessary, as it will be easy to determine which
drug a patient was taking from his/her prescription records. Where there
is threat to public health, the FDA will work with the manufacturer to get
the product off the market.99 Although the FDAhas not voiced support for
the same degree of traceability as some industry representatives, the FDA
has asserted that FOB products must have distinguishable, non-proprietary
names to avoid any confusion and safety hazards.
D. Post-Marketing Studies
Different industry representatixves, the FDA, and consumer represntatixves
hasve expressed sside-sprcad support for post-mnarket studies. The FDA
posits that the best model for post-market studics xxill gixve the agcncy the
authoritx to detcrmine the extent of the post-markct rcquircments based on
the information contained, or lacking, in the application.' 00
Somc questions, howverei still remain as to the FDA's ability to oxversee
eftectixvely post-market studies. In 2006, after sexveral high-profile ding
safety cascs and Congressional hcarings, Senator Grasslcy and Congressman
Barton requcsted that thc Goxvemnent Accountability Ofticc (GAO) rev iexw
thc FDA's postmarket decision-making proccss.101 The 2006 GAO report
generally found that the "FDA lacks a clear and effective process for making
decisions about, and providing management oversight of, postnarket
drug safety issues."o2 TIhe 2006 report attributed these findings to a lack
of resources and authority, and ultimately recommended that Congress
expand the FDA's authority to require drug sponsors to conduct postmarket
studies when the FDA determines additional data is needed.103 The report
concluded that, while the FDA has the authority to withdraw the approval
of a drug on the market for safety concerns, the FDA rarely exercises such
authority. Finally, the report observed that the ten drugs withdrawn from
the market between 2000 and 2006 were all withdrawn voluntarily.104
This loxw withdrawal rate can be
attributed to FDVs efforts to work
with sponsors to change their labeling
or take other measures to remedy the
safety concern.109 Although noting
th t the F1A often relies on voluntary
postmarket commitments (IPMCs)
from sponsors, the 2006 report relied
on a Ifts Center report to conclude
that such PMCs are not consistently
completed.10 Iven though it seems
clear that the FDA has the authoritx
to withdraw approval, the 2006
report cited administrative penalties
as the leverage the FDA often uses
to get compliance with PMCs, often
unsuccessfully. 10 The 2006 report
also cited a PMC study completion rate of 17%/0 in the 1980s and 24%
betxween 1991 and 2003.'os Following this report, Congress passed the
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FI1AAA), which
further expanded the FDXs authority to require postmarketing studies
under certain circumstances. 109 The FI1AA also gave the FDA additional
means offunding.I10
In 2009, at the request of Senator Grassley, the GAO again looked into
the FIOX's oversight of postmarketing requirements and commitments
(PMRs and PMCs), specifically those related to accelerated approval
applications." 11 he 2009 report concluded that the "FDA has not been
routinely monitoring the status of postnarketing studies, primarily because
oversight of these studies is not considered a priority. Regarding its
enforcement of postmarketing study requirements, we found FDA has not
fulls utilized its available enforcement tools, even xxwhen sponsors have failed
to complete required studies."" This conclusion was based on statements
by both the HHS Office of Inspector General and an HHS contractor that
PMC and PMR studies are not as high a priority as reviewing new drug
applications.113 The 2009 report also found FDX's enforcement action
lacking based on a rexview of twxelve spoinsors of drugs approved through
the accelerated process that xxere late in submitting their PMVC/PMR1 status
reports. The GtAO found thxat FD)A only sent an adininistratixe action letter
to one of those twxelve sponsors. 1 14 \dditionally, the 2009 repoit found thatL
wxhihe thirtsy-six ot ninety selected applications xvith PMC s or PMRs had
not fiulfilled the study requirements. including sexveral approved more than
ten sears ago, none wvere xwithdraxxn fiom the market."' The 2009 report
also criticizcd the FDA for not creating guidclines under wxhich it xxould
wvithdiraxx an accelerated approxval drug from the market upon failurc to
complete the PMC or PMR.116 In response to the 2009 report, the FDA
conceded that its oversight of postmarketing studies had been inadequate,
which it attributed to insufficient staffing, deficient 11 resources, and
competing priorities. I he FDA proposed to address such inadequacies
through improved tracking by its contractor and a new database."I
Later in 2009, the GAO released another report on FDA's efforts to oversee
postmarketing studies.119 This report concluded that since the 2006 report,
the FDA had taken initiatives to increase staff and implement tracking
systems focused on postmarket safety; however, since the expansion of the
FDA's authoritx under FDAAA, the FDA's postmarket workload has also
increased significantly. Therefore, it is still unclear if these additional
eflorts the FDA has taken will allow for a more eflective oversight of
postmarket studies.121 Under the current regulations drug sponsors have
clear obligations to complete PMCs/PMRs; however, sponsors may be able
to successfully argue to the FDA that they should be released from the PMC
because the study is either no longer feasible or no longer would provide
useful information.
Some industry representatives have called for heightened postmarket
requirements for both innovator biologics and F13 products. A case
study of Omnitrope, a biologic approved by the 1FDA through the 505(b)
(2) abbreviated pathway based on Genotropin's existence, further reveals
the need for postmarket studies. After Omnitrope was approved for the
markets in the United States and Europe, two adverse events occurred in
children overseas. Because these adverse events occurred overseas, and
thus beyond FDA's scope, the FDA does not have as complete reports
as it normally would and thus refused to make conclusions based on
these adverse events.124 uite possibly, if there had been more stringent
postmarket requirements, at the very least, these two adverse events could
have been detected sooner and perhaps even avoided.
E. Exclusivity Period
The FTC has stated a twelve-to-fourteen year exclusivity period is too long
and projects that many innovators will continue to dominate the market
even after an F013 enters the market.125 Some economists, however, have
estimated that an innovator company will need 12.9 to 16.2 years of market
exclusivity before it will be able to break even." iyet others assert that
we do not have enough information to know that the frequently discussed
twelve year period will be sufficient to protect innovators' interest, and
suggest a more flexible rule to preserve these interests.
IThere is a serious concern that, without a sufficient exclusivity period.
innovators' profits, or even ability to break even will be less certain, resulting
in innovators not being able to ascertain financing and. in turn, resulting
in a tesxer innosative biologics, xshich unquestionably help thousands of
Americans eveiy day. In the drug nmarketL once a geneic enters the nmarketL
the innosators' profits drop diastically'i IThe research and deselopment
risks associated wxith biologics are not isolated to innoxvatoirs. Some have
speculated that the uncertainties in dev elopmcnt and high costs may deter
many potential FOB manufactuiers.'
The 1FDA recognizes the need loi a period ol market and/or data exclusisvity
that ssould alloss innosation to continue.'" If Congress had not cieated
additional exclusisvity piotections beyond the cuirrent patent protections tor
innoxators, the FDA is concerned that innovation would suffer.1
Almost a decade of political discourse has given light to the Imany
possibilities in creating and regulating an abbreviated pathway for FOBs.
With the new composition of the 112th Congress, a repeal of the PPACA
or parts of it is not out of the realm of possibilities. Although not perfect,
the 3PCI is a valuable piece of legislation that should be saved from repeal.
Congress, however, might be well advised to readdress some provisions of
past bills and amend the 3PCI
A new amendment would include a provision, such as that in S. 1695,
which would extend the exclusivity period for biologics intended for treat
rare forms of diseases. Federal agencies and the public haxve voiced serious
concerns about a short exclusivity period stifling innovation, and about hiow
long an innovator biologic needs exclusivity to make a profit, which in turn
encourages further research and development. Unquestionably, estimates
vary drastically on the required length of an exclusivity period because
different biologic products take different amounts of time and money to
develop. Biologic products will be used by a smaller population and thus
manufacturers will have a much harder time recouping expenses and would
benefit greatly from a longer exclusivity period. Such a provision also
would allow for a continued incentive for such research and development,
while allowing FOBs for more widely used biologic products onto the
market in an expeditious manner.
Congress should also amend the BPCI to require the Secretary to issue
guidance to inform the industry and public on how the FDA will make FOB
application determinations. Although the Secretary could issue guidance on
her own accord, Congress should prioritize transparency in the regulatory
system and require the Secretary to issue guidance and standards.132
Another important amendment to the BPCI would be one that limits the
FDA's authority to designate FOBs and biologics as interchangeable. The
BPCI gives the Secretary full discretion to designate FOBs and biologics as
interchangeable without clinical studies. The FDA has repeatedly asserted
that the current state of scientific technolooy does not allows one to establish
the safety and efficacy of interchanging biologic products, and that clinical
trials are still needed to ensure the public health. Although the current
language of the B1PCI may make the regulatory and legislative processes
easier down the road when the scientific technology has developed far
beyond what it is capable of today, Congress should not have delegated to
the Secretary to do something that, as even the Secretary concedes, cannot
be done today. "Congress should amend the BP11CI to strike this provision
and readdress the legislation when Congress itself can establish that the
scientific technology exists.
At a minimum, the Secretary should make it clear through guidance and
policy statmemnts that it wsill not aise ihc clinical studies requirement in
the BPC I until there is substantial scientific cevidence that safe and effectisve
interchangeability can be established through non-clinical means. While
getting nxorc cost-eftectisve medications to patients in need should absway s
be a high priority of HHS, patient safety should be paranxount. Without
an interchangeability determinxation, the FOBs xxill still be axvailable to
the patients whbo need them, but only through the qualified expeitise and
case-by-case analy sis of that patient's owsn nmedical doctor. Absent clear,
widely supported scientific evidence to establish the safety and efficacy
of interchanging an innovator biologic and an FOB, te decision to switch
the patient's medications should be left in the able hands of the medical
profession.
Overall, the BPCI was a much needed piece of legislation and expansion
of the FDAs authority. After nearly a decade of debating various proposals,
the BPCI seems to strike a fairly good balance between the innovator and
the generic industries.
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